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Abstract 
 
Our understanding of communication and its evolution has advanced significantly 
through the study of simple models of interacting senders and receivers of signals. 
Many theorists have thought that the resources of mathematical information theory 
are all that is needed to capture the meaning or content that is being communicated 
in these systems. However, the way theorists routinely talk about the models 
implicitly draws on a conception of content that is richer than bare informational 
content, especially in contexts where false content is important. This paper shows 
that this concept can be made precise by defining a notion of functional content that 
captures the degree to which different states of the world are involved in stabilizing 
senders’ and receivers’ use of a signal at equilibrium. A series of case studies is used 
to contrast functional content with informational content, and to illustrate the 
explanatory role and limitations of this definition of functional content. 
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1  Introduction 
Recent years have seen dramatic advances in our understanding of communication 
and its evolution, through new models developed in biology, philosophy, linguistics, 
and economics. The models in these areas take different forms, but many can be 
seen as having a common theme. They show how sign-using interactions between 
senders and receivers are stabilized by means of selection processes that bear on 
sender and receiver behaviours.1 
 Communication is usually thought to involve the production of signs or 
representations that have meaning, or content of some kind. Writers working in, or 
influenced by, the mathematical theory of information have sometimes wanted to set 
these issues aside, as irrelevant or positively unhelpful. Freeman Dyson claims that 
information theory’s central dogma is that ‘meaning is irrelevant’ (Dyson [2011]; see 
also Shannon [1948], p. 379). Another recent discussion concurs: 
 
 
When information theorists think about coding, they are not thinking about 
semantic properties. All of the semantic properties are stuffed into the codebook, 
the interface between source structure and channel structure, which to 
information theorists is as interesting as a phonebook is to sociologists. 
(Bergstrom & Rosvall [2011], p. 171) 
 
 
In an important treatment of this topic, Skyrms ([2010]) argues that although 
questions of meaning and content are worth considering, a straightforward extension 
of basic ideas in information theory suffices to handle them. Signals have 
informational content when they change the probabilities of states of the world, or of 
a receiver's actions. Informational content exists whenever probabilities are changed 
in this way, regardless of what role the messages play; the informational content of 
a signal is represented by a vector which records, for each possible world state, how 
much the signal changes the probability of that state compared to its antecedent 
probability. This, for Skyrms, is all we need to recognize when thinking about 
                                          
1 Bergstrom and Lachmann [1998]; Clark [2011]; Crawford and Sobel [1982]; 
Farrell and Rabin [1996]; Huttegger et al. [2010]; Lewis [1969]; Maynard Smith and 
Harper [2003]; Robson [1990]; Skyrms [2010]; Spence [1973]; Stegmann [2013]; 
Zollman et al. [2013]. 
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content. 
 We agree that one way of understanding the content of signals in sender-
receiver systems is by applying information-theoretic ideas in this way. But, we 
argue, there is also another approach to the interpretation of signals in systems of 
this kind, one tied to the way that actions guided by a signal have consequences that 
can stabilize signing behaviours. 
Note first that whether signals have informational content, in Skyrms' sense, 
does not depend on whether they are part of a system with signs being used 
successfully to coordinate action with the state of the world. They would still carry 
informational content even if they were part of a system in which the use of signals 
is not achieving anything useful at all, the system is far from equilibrium, and signals 
are giving rise to behaviours poorly matched with the world. Existing discussions in 
the modelling literature sometimes acknowledge, explicitly or tacitly, the appeal of a 
notion of content that is tied to the maintenance of equilibria in some way.  
One response to this situation is to look for a view of content that combines 
informational and ‘functional’ considerations of this kind. This may well be fruitful, 
but our approach in this paper is different. We will treat informational content and 
functional content as two separate and useful concepts, with distinct explanatory 
roles. Informational content involves probabilistic associations between signs and the 
world; functional content involves relations between signs and the world that figure 
in the stabilization of a system of sign use. The aim of the paper is to analyze 
content in a way guided not by common-sense intuitions but by consideration of 
which notions of content are useful when thinking about signalling systems and their 
evolution.  
 The next section outlines the modelling framework used in the paper. 
Subsequent sections describe the two kinds of content and then proceed through a 
series of cases that illustrate the two kinds of content and their complementary 
roles. The paper aims to motivate a distinction between informational and functional 
content but does not purport to be the last word on how functional content should 
best be formalized. In the discussion of some cases we acknowledge some problems 
for our proposed formalisation and provisionally sketch some ways it could be 
amended to overcome those limitations. 
 
2  Modelling Framework 
Our discussion is concerned with signalling systems that have the structure of a 
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Lewis signalling game. David Lewis ([1969]) gave a model of signalling in which we 
assume two agents, a sender and a receiver, where the sender has access to 
information about the state of the world but cannot act on it except to send signals 
of some kind. The receiver can see only the signals, but can act in a way that 
generates payoffs for both sides. The payoffs resulting from a receiver's pairing of an 
act with a state of the world might be the same for sender and receiver, or different.  
 Lewis assumed that sender and receiver policies were rationally chosen in a 
situation of common knowledge. Brian Skyrms ([1996], [2010]) gave an 
evolutionary recasting of Lewis's model. Rational choice was replaced by natural 
selection, or in some cases by simple forms of learning. Evolution, learning, and 
choice are all processes in which the consequences of behaviours can ‘feed back’ and 
re-shape the rules governing behaviour at later time-steps. The sender modifies (or 
maintains) its sender's rule, which maps states of the world to signals; the receiver 
modifies (or maintains) its receiver's rule, which maps signals to acts. When a 
combination of a sender's rule and a receiver's rule is such that neither side can 
change their rule unilaterally and be better off, given what the other is doing, the 
system is in a Nash equilibrium. When a combination of rules is such that any 
unilateral change makes the changer worse off, the system is in a strict Nash 
equilibrium. 
 The Lewis-Skyrms model is related to models discussed in economics 
(Crawford and Sobel [1982]; Farrell and Rabin [1996]), and in evolutionary biology 
(Bergstrom and Lachmann [1998]; Maynard Smith and Harper [1995], [2003]; 
Zollman et al. [2013]). Models in economics have explored issues like honesty in 
advertising and the use of signals to help maintain cooperation (Spence [1973], 
Robson [1990]). Honesty in signalling has also been a focus of biological and 
evolutionary models, investigating especially the way that a cost associated with a 
signal can enforce honesty. Both evolutionary and economic modelling have explored 
the consequences of divergence of interests between senders and receivers for the 
possibility and nature of signalling. Our discussion will be focused on the set-up 
described by Lewis and Skyrms, but many of our conclusions can be extended more 
broadly. 
 Formally, we are concerned with situations where there is an exogenously 
determined state of the world {S1, S2, ...}, a sender who can detect this state and 
has a range of signals or messages available, {M1, M2, …}, and a receiver who can 
see the signals and may use them when choosing among available actions, 
{A1, A2, ...}. States of the world are associated with objective probabilities, P(Si). 
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Combinations of acts and states are associated with payoffs for each agent, 
represented with matrices (introduced below in Section 4). A sender's rule is a 
mapping from states to messages; a receiver's rule is a mapping from messages to 
acts. Both these rules may be ‘pure’ or ‘mixed’; a sender may, for example, respond 
to S1 by always producing M1 (a pure strategy), or perhaps by producing M1 with 
probability p and M2 with probability 1-p (a mixed strategy). Our analysis of cases in 
this paper will be simple. In general, we will note combinations of senders' and 
receivers' rules that are equilibrium states, states where neither side has any 
incentive to change their behaviour. In some cases, drawing on the work of others, 
we will give a richer description which notes how a case behaves under some rule of 
evolutionary change. Much of our discussion is intended to be neutral, though, about 
the details of the selection process shaping the sender's and receiver's behaviours. 
 
3  Two Kinds of Content 
3.1  Informational content 
An appealing way to think about the content of signals in sender-receiver systems is 
to draw on concepts from information theory (Shannon [1948], Dretske [1981]). 
Signals carry information about states of the world when they change the 
probabilities of those states (Skyrms [2010]). The term ‘change’ here should not be 
understood as involving strange causal relations between signal and state, but 
merely the fact that the probability of a state conditional upon the signal is different 
from the unconditional probability of that state. A signal has content when it tells us 
something about how the world is, where ‘tells’ is a matter of changing probabilities, 
providing evidence. Dretske ([1981]) developed a view of this kind, but required for 
a signal to have content that it raise the probability of some state of the world to 
one. A signal says that the world is in S2, for example, if the probability of the world 
being in S2, given the signal, is one, and its probability independent of the signal is 
less than one. Skyrms ([2010]) outlines a more general view of the informational 
content of signals. A signal has informational content if it changes the probabilities of 
at least some states of the world, and its content is given by all the changes it makes 
to the probabilities of those states. So if a signal raises the probability of S2 but does 
not bring it to one, it can still tell us something about S2. For Skyrms, the kind of 
content where some states’ probabilities are reduced to zero is a special case (which 
he labels ‘propositional content’).  
 Skyrms adopts a particular format for representing the changes made by a 
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signal to the probabilities of a set of states. For a set of states {Si}, the content of a 
signal Mj is constituted by the changes made to the probability of each state by the 
signal, where each ‘change’ is measured as the binary logarithm of the ratio of the 
conditional to the unconditional probability of that state. That is, the content of Mj is: 
 
<log2(P(S1|Mj)/P(S1)), log2(P(S2|Mj)/P(S2)),... log2(P(Si|Mj)/P(Si)),... > 
 
So the content of a message is a vector. In the special case where a message 
reduces the probabilities of some states to zero, Skyrms labels those states in the 
vector with minus infinity; for example, if a message eliminates all but one of four 
initially equiprobable states, the content will be of the form: <-∞, 2, -∞, -∞>. Then 
the content can be given in a familiar propositional form by disjoining the states 
remaining. Here the content of the signal is S2; in another case it might be S2-or-S3, 
and so on.  
 We follow Skyrms in thinking of content in general as given by a vector, with 
contents that definitively rule out some states being a special case, but we will do 
this with a simpler method than Skyrms's. For us, the informational content of a 
message M is the vector of post-signal probabilities of the states, P(Si|M); so in the 
case given above where a message eliminates all but one of four initially 
equiprobable states, the content will be of the form <0, 1, 0, 0>. Both Skyrms' and 
our method have advantages and disadvantages (Godfrey-Smith [2012]). A 
disadvantage with using post-signal probabilities to represent content is the fact that 
the content vector is well-defined even if the message has not changed any 
probabilities, so P(Si) = P(Si|M) for all i. Our response is to stipulate that in cases 
where all the states have their probabilities unchanged by a signal, the signal has no 
informational content. Our use of the posterior probability vector is motivated in part 
by the way it makes possible some formal comparisons between informational and 
functional content. 
 So the informational content of a signal is the distribution of probabilities of 
states of the world, conditional on that signal, with the proviso that at least some of 
these probabilities differ from the unconditional probabilities of the states. The 
informational properties of signals depend solely, then, on the unconditional 
probabilities of the states together with the sender's rule. In cases where a message 
rules out some states of the world, a narrative summary of the content can be given 
(in the form ‘S1’, or ‘S1–or–S2’). When no states of the world are ruled out, a 
narrative summary would be vacuous. As Skyrms notes, a signal can carry 
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information about both the states of the world perceived by the sender and about 
acts produced by the receiver. Here we will discuss informational content only about 
the state of the world. 
 
3.2  Functional content 
Signals have informational content (in our sense and Skyrms's sense) whether a 
sender-receiver system is at equilibrium or not, and whether the signals are doing 
anything useful for the users or not. If a sender and receiver have rules configured 
so that the sender maps states to signals one-to-one, and the receiver maps signals 
to acts one-to-one, but in a way that guarantees that the act produced is the worst 
one possible in each state, signals have the same informational content that they 
would have if the sender was performing the same mapping of states to signals but 
the receiver was producing the best act in each state. Informational content is 
insensitive to facts about how well things are going and whether the system is at any 
kind of equilibrium. 
This is not in any sense a problem for the notion of informational content. 
However, many writers have formed the view that content, of at least some variety, 
is dependent on those further factors. This might be seen as recognition of a richer 
concept of ‘meaning’ than mere informational content. For example, Simon 
Huttegger takes linguistic meaning (‘the linguistic component of the truth of a 
statement’) to be fixed by the conventions of meaning (Huttegger [2007a], p. 2), 
which are strict Nash equilibria of signalling games ([2007a], p. 9).2 Similarly, 
William Harms identifies ‘primitive content’ with pairs of dispositions of senders to 
produce signals and receivers to act on signals, when such pairs have been stabilized 
by evolution or learning (Harms [2004]).3 
 These thoughts suggest that there is an additional way of thinking about 
content in signalling systems, having to do with the stabilization of the setup and the 
beneficial consequences of sender-receiver coordination. In the biological literature 
on animal signalling, the concept of ‘functional reference’ has been applied to such 
                                          
2 Huttegger’s work on the distinction between indicative and imperative content also 
suggests that there is a role for functional considerations in defining content: 
Huttegger [2007b]; see also Zollman [2011]. These discussions may lead in the 
direction of an alternative notion of functional content to the one presented in the 
present paper. 
3  Indeed, Skyrms himself sometimes privileges the kind of information flow found at 
equilibrium—where the receiver ‘acts just as she would have if she had observed the 
state directly’ (Skyrms [2010], p. 47)—over other cases where just as much 
information is transmitted. 
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situations.4 In philosophy, both information-theoretic relationships and relationships 
involving success and stabilization of representation-using systems have been used 
as the basis for general theories of content. They are usually seen as rivals. 
Informational theories analyze content in terms of correlations between 
representations and states (Dretske [1981], Fodor [1990]); teleosemantic theories 
hold that the content of a representation derives from the way a ‘consumer’ system 
acts on the representation to produce adaptive behaviour that has been relevant to 
the stabilization of that representation-using system (Millikan [1984], [1989]; 
Papineau [1984], [1993]). For example, when a vervet monkey sees a snake and 
makes a particular sound, ‘consumer’ monkeys run for cover in the trees. This has 
been useful in cases where the sound was produced in the presence of snakes, so 
Snake! is the content of the sound, even if those cases are rare and many sounds 
are false alarms. Some philosophical theories of content rely on both functional and  
informational properties in combination (Neander [forthcoming]; Price [2001]; Shea 
[2007]).5 
 Those earlier debates about informational and teleofunctional theories were 
not generally carried out in the context of a sender-receiver model of the kind we are 
concerned with here.6 Rather than aiming for a choice between informational and 
functional properties, or a ‘gluing together’ of them, here we look at the idea that 
there are two kinds of content that messages can have in a sender-receiver system. 
One kind is derived from informational properties of the message – the way 
messages correlate with states of the world – and the other arises from the role the 
message plays in stabilization of the system through some process of selection. 
 Accordingly, we define functional content as follows. The messages in a 
sender-receiver system have functional content only if the system is at an 
equilibrium maintained by some selection process.7 If it is, then for each signal M, we 
ask whether there is a behaviour (or distribution over behaviours) of the receiver 
specific to M, in the sense that the receiver responds differently to M than it does to 
                                          
4 Macedonia and Evans [1993]; Scarantino [2013]; cf. Wheeler and Fischer [2012]. 
5 In the literature on ‘functional reference’ in animal communication, mentioned 
above, Scarantino does the same in combining a ‘contextual perception criterion’ 
(dependent on evolutionary functions) with a ‘contextual information criterion’ 
[2013] p. 1016). 
6 Harms was perhaps the first to connect sender-receiver models with a functional 
notion of content (Harms [2004]). 
7 Birch [2014] uses a different way of defining content to argue that signals in out-
of-equilibrium states have propositional content (which, as with our functional 
content, in general differs from informational content). 
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some other available signal. (Note that this allows that the receiver may respond the 
same way to some other signal M’, but rules out that the receiver should respond the 
same way to all signals in the system.) If so, we look at whether there is a specific 
state of the world that obtains on some occasions when the message is sent, where 
the relation between that state of the world and the behaviours produced by the 
message contributes to the stabilization of those sender and receiver behaviours. If 
so, that state is the content of M. If the receiver’s behaviour in response to M is 
stabilized by the obtaining of more than one world state on different occasions, the 
signal will have a disjunctive content involving all those world states. 
 In the case of informational content, we followed Skyrms in saying that 
content in general is given by a vector. We apply the same principle to functional 
content. The informational content vector takes the form of a list of entries that sum 
to one – the posterior probabilities of states of the world. The functional content 
vector we use here is also a list of entries that sum to one, though these entries are 
not probabilities. Whereas the informational content vector for a signal gives, for 
each state, how probable it is in the light of the signal, the functional content vector 
gives, for each state, the degree of involvement of that state in the stabilization of 
the sender's and receiver's behaviours regarding that signal. In the simplest cases, 
as with the vervet's Snake! alarm call, there is just one state of the world whose 
obtaining figures in the stabilization of the system. But suppose that this particular 
alarm call has been mostly useful when there have been snakes around, but has 
afforded some protection when there are wild dogs around instead. Then the call has 
some functional involvement with both states.  
 More precisely, we define the functional content vector for a message in 
relation to baseline payoffs for the sender and receiver obtained in the absence of 
signalling. (The following recipe is expressed more formally in the Appendix.) The 
baseline for each agent is the agent’s average payoff in a situation where the 
receiver adopts the best strategy available to it without conditioning its behaviour on 
any signals (cf. Scott-Phillips et al. [2012], p. 1944). Non-zero entries in the vector 
for the functional content of a message correspond to states in which the message is 
sent and both agents receive above-baseline payoffs, given the receiver's rule for 
that message. For each such state we calculate the difference between the sender 
payoffs received in that state and its baseline; we calculate the corresponding 
difference for the receiver. When necessary we take the smaller difference, to yield a 
single value for each state. (See below for discussion of when this minimum must be 
considered and what role it plays.) These values are weighted by the posterior 
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probabilities of the states, given the signal, and normalized to sum to one.8 The 
result is a vector representing the relative importance of each state to the 
stabilization of the sender and receiver rules for that message. This can be seen as a 
measure of the degree of involvement of the message with each state, given how the 
message is produced and used to guide action. (Some complications arise when 
sender and receiver payoffs differ, but do not differ so much that only one payoff is 
above baseline - we discuss these below.) 
 In that first presentation we assumed that the receiver performs a single 
action in response to M. A receiver might ‘mix’ its behavioural responses to M, 
however, producing (say) act A1 half the time and A2 half the time. In those cases, 
each action is analyzed separately in the way outlined above, and the results are 
averaged, weighted by the probability the receiver will produce that action in 
response to M. 
 The two kinds of content have the same form – distributions over states of 
the world, one reflecting posterior probabilities and one reflecting functional 
involvement. In cases where one or more entries are zero, a narrative summary of 
the content is available; this applies to both kinds of content. For example, a vector 
of the form <0, 0.6, 0.4> can summarized S2-or-S3. Vectors with no non-zero 
entries do not have a non-vacuous narrative summary. 
 Sometimes the informational content and functional content will coincide and 
in some cases will diverge. Lastly, the truth – the state of the world on an occasion 
when a signal is produced – can also be represented in the same form as the two 
kinds of content, with a distribution summing (trivially) to one. If, for example, there 
are three possible states of the world, S1, S2, and S3, and on some occasion S2 is the 
actual state, this can be represented in a vector: <0, 1, 0>. So the state of the 
world, the informational content of a signal, and the functional content of a signal, all 
have the same form. 
Before showing how these definitions play out in some cases from the existing 
literature we will comment briefly on two alternative proposals. Harms ([2010]) 
illustrates a rather different way of connecting Lewis-style signalling games with 
philosophical work on teleosemantic theories of content. Harms does not use vectors 
to capture functional content. Our treatment also differs from Harms’s in making 
functional content partly a matter of the relative magnitude of the payoffs received 
in different states. Harms has a different focus, driven by concerns about how the 
                                          
8 This is equivalent to weighting the posterior probabilities by a function of the 
payoffs. 
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world can be divided into states objectively. As a result, he dispenses with states of 
the world external to the sender-receiver system and characterizes his model only by 
reference to states of the sender’s sensory apparatus and the payoffs that are 
received in those states. Functional contents are regions of a state space defined by 
the range of available sensory states and payoffs. There is not scope here to explore 
the extent to which Harms’ approach is a rival to the one we develop here and the 
extent to which the two approaches are complementary. 
Our functional content vector is broadly in the spirit of Oliver Lean's 
‘informational functions’ (Lean [2014]). However, Lean casts his approach as 
contrasting with teleosemantic accounts of semantic information in biology, arguing 
that greater clarity is achieved by analyzing function separately from information, 
and treating information in the style of Shannon.  By contrast, we argue that a 
function-related notion of content is a useful resource for analyzing signalling 
systems. 
We now turn to examples which illustrate the different roles of the two kinds 
of content. 
 
4  Cases 
4.1  Simplest case 
 
< INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE > 
 
The simplest case is where there are two world states, two signals and two acts, and 
the world states are equally probable. Both agents receive a positive payoff when A1 
is produced in S1 and the same when A2 is produced in S2, and neither receives a 
payoff otherwise. There are four possible sender strategies and four possible receiver 
strategies (leaving aside mixed strategies). Two of these are combinations of sender 
and receiver behaviours in which maximum payoff is achieved by both parties on 
every trial because signals are used to perfectly correlate the receiver's actions with 
the state of the world. One of these signalling systems is shown in Figure 1; here the 
sender invariably sends M1 in response to S1, and the receiver produces A1 in 
response, and so on. The other simply swaps M1 with M2 in Figure 1. These are the 
only strict Nash equilibria of the game. Recent models have also shown that 
evolutionary processes can guide populations of various kinds to these equilibrium 
states (Skyrms [2010], Huttegger et al. [2010]). 
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 At the equilibrium shown in Figure 1, signal M1 makes state S1 certain and 
completely rules out state S2, so the post-signal probabilities are <1,0>. The 
functional content of M1 is determined, as explained above, by examining the 
behaviour of the receiver specific to that signal and noting which pairing of messages 
to states contributes to the stabilization of the system. In this case the functional 
contents of both messages are the same as their informational contents; M1 is 
produced always and only in S1, and M1 gives rise to A1, which contributes to the 
stabilization of the system if and only if S1 obtains. So the contents are as set out in 
Table 1. 
 
< INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE > 
 
4.2  Partial pooling 
Even in simple situations like the set-up above, as soon as the probabilities of the 
two world states differ, informative signalling may become evolutionarily unlikely. In 
a pooling equilibrium, the sender sends the same signal in both states and so the 
signal is completely uninformative about the state of the world. Correspondingly the 
receiver ignores the signal and performs the same action regardless. These equilibria 
exist even when the probabilities of states are equal, but they are more 
evolutionarily relevant when those probabilities are unequal, because in evolutionary 
models of situations in which the probabilities are unequal, populations do frequently 
end up in pooling equilibria. These are models in which each agent in the population 
plays the sender role half the time and the receiver role half the time, receiving 
payoffs according to the matching of receiver actions with states, and the population 
evolves by the replicator dynamics (Skyrms [2010], Huttegger et al. [2010]). Pooling 
is a common outcome because agents implementing pairs of behaviours that 
constitute a signalling system incur a cost when they encounter pooling agents, since 
they then condition their behaviour on a completely uninformative signal. Simply 
performing the behaviour best suited to the most probable state is sufficiently 
profitable that it may be hard for signalling to invade. 
 Suppose we have a case like this, with S1 much more probable than S2, where 
the sender sends M1 in every state and the receiver performs A1 regardless of what 
they see. Then the signals do not change the probabilities of states of the world at 
all, in which case no signal has informational content in our sense. As the receiver 
performs the same acts in response to all messages, no signal has functional content 
either. As described above, a signal only has functional content when there is a 
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characteristic behaviour resulting from that signal that plays a role in the 
stabilization of the system. Here no signals are associated with characteristic 
behaviours in this sense.  
 Once there are three states, signals and acts, partial pooling becomes 
possible, where the sender pools two world states together under the same signal 
but sends a different signal in the third state.9 In the strategies shown in Figure 2, a 
case drawn from Skyrms ([2010]), the sender sends M1 in response to both S1 and 
S2, and mixes M2 and M3 in response to S3, with probabilities x and 1-x respectively. 
The receiver maps both M2 and M3 to act A3, and mixes its response to M1, producing 
A1 and A2 with probabilities y and 1-y respectively. Here we assume again that the 
three states of the world are equally probable. The assumptions about payoffs are as 
they were above: both actors receive a payoff in world state Si if and only if act Ai is 
produced, with the magnitude of the payoffs the same in each case. In evolutionary 
simulations of the kind described above, some populations of senders and receivers 
do end up at equilibria of this kind (Skyrms [2010], Huttegger et al. [2010]).   
 
< INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE > 
 
 In this case message M1 shifts the probabilities equally towards both S1 and 
S2, and M2 and M3 both shift the probabilities towards S3, giving rise to the 
informational contents set out in Table 2. 
 The receiver’s behaviour in response to M1 is to perform a mixture of A1 and 
A2. What is the functional content of M1? What is the condition whose obtaining on 
occasions where M1 is acted on explains the success of this mixed policy of 
behaviour? The answer is that this depends on the value of y. In some situations, 
both S1 and S2 are involved in generating payoffs that are above baseline, given the 
mix of actions performed in response to M1. In those cases, the condition is 
disjunctive; the functional content of M1 is S1-or-S2. That is a rough narrative 
summary, though; the functional content vector for M1 is more specific, as it reflects 
the fact that proportion 3y-1 of the payoffs received at equilibrium are in world state 
S1 and 2-3y in S2.   
                                          
9 Barrett [2006] is the first discussion of pooling equilibria for signalling games such 
that, for any number n, there are n states, n signals and n acts; see also Barrett 
[2007]. 
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 In other situations, when y is close to an extreme value, one or other of S1 
and S2 does not play such a role, and the functional content is not disjunctive. The 
contents of the three signals are set out in Table 2. 
 
< INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE > 
 
As shown in Table 2, this case features divergence between functional and 
informational content, where the degree of divergence depends on y. When 
expressed in narrative terms, the functional content is stronger, for high and low 
values of y. 
  
4.3  Bottleneck 
 
< INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE > 
 
 
 We now consider a different situation in which sender and receiver payoffs are 
suboptimal but the system can be at equilibrium. This is a case where there are not 
enough messages available to cover all the states – there are three world states but 
only two signals available by which to communicate about them. In the solution in 
Figure 3, action A2 is never performed, and in S2 the agents receive the suboptimal 
reward of 4 obtainable by performing A1 in S2. This combination of behaviours 
produces the best outcome possible in the situation (Skyrms [2010], p. 113). 
 In this and subsequent cases the details of payoffs are important. We 
represent them in a table with entries for the payoff received for each action in each 
world state. In Table 3 below sender and receiver payoffs do not differ from one 
another. 
 
< INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE > 
 
 
 The strategy here (Figure 3) is structurally similar to the strategy in the 
previous case in that it pools two world states (Figure 2). This is another case in 
which the functional content of M1 differs from its informational content. Though the 
behaviour produced in response to M1 does yield some payoff in S2, this payoff does 
not exceed the baseline achievable in the absence of signalling. For M2, in contrast, 
the functional and informational contents line up entirely. (See Table 4 for details.) 
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< INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE > 
 
4.4  Partial common interest 
We now consider a game in which the payoffs for sender and receiver differ such that 
their interests are not fully aligned. They agree about the best action in one of the 
states (S3), but in the other two they have a different preference order.10 The payoffs 
are shown in Table 5. In Figure 4 a combination of sender and receiver rules is 
shown that yields an equilibrium for this system (Skyrms [2010], p. 80). The sender 
uses M1 to rule out S3 and raise the probability of S1 and S2 equally, inducing the 
receiver to perform the sender’s preferred action in both states, since that action 
also pays off reasonably well for the receiver. The sender has an incentive not to 
differentiate S1 and S2 because then the receiver would perform its preferred action 
for each, to the detriment of the sender. So here imperfect alignment of interests 
produces partial pooling of states by the sender. 
 
< INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE > 
 
 In the previous payoff matrix (Table 3), there was one entry for both sender 
and receiver payoffs in a combination of act and state. In Table 5 each cell contains 
a pair of numbers, for sender and receiver payoffs respectively, for the 
corresponding act and state. 
 
< INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE > 
 
One reason researchers have been interested in cases where the interests of 
senders and receiver differ is because it raises the possibility of deception. However 
deception might be analyzed in detail, at least the paradigm cases involve the sender 
using signals to achieve payoffs that run counter to the best interests of the receiver 
by inducing the receiver to perform actions that are not well aligned, given their 
interests, with the state of the world. Skyrms argues that the equilibrium shown in 
Figure 4 is a case of deception. We do not agree. What is true in this case is that 
signal M1 carries less than perfect information about the actual state, failing to 
                                          
10  For a discussion of measures of the degree common interest based on 
divergence between the sender's and receiver's preference orderings over actions in 
states, see Godfrey-Smith and Martinez [2013]. 
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distinguish S1 from S2. The receiver produces a cover-all behaviour that generates 
reasonably good payoffs in both S1 and S2. In no circumstance does the receiver 
produce an action well-suited only to one state when a different state obtains. The 
receiver's payoffs are always above their baseline. The functional and informational 
contents of the two messages used are given in Table 6. The sender is conveying 
and the receiver is acting on a true disjunctive content every time M1 is sent (S1-or-
S2). 
 
< INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE > 
 
Part of the reason Skyrms holds that this is a case of deception is the fact 
that when M1 is sent there is misinformation; the probability of a non-actual state of 
the world is raised by the signal (Skyrms [2010]. p. 80). However, that was also true 
in the two cases of pooling discussed above (cases 4.2 and 4.3), where signals, 
again, did not discriminate all states. We think this case, 4.4, is merely a case of 
strategic withholding of information by the sender, a phenomenon quite distinct from 
deception. We will next consider a case that we do regard as one of bona fide 
deception. 
 
4.5  Deception 
To illustrate the possibility of genuine deception we consider a signalling game 
relevant to animal communication, modifying a game discussed by Zollman et al. 
(2013: their Fig. 2, Table 2 and Fig. 3). Suppose senders are males and receivers are 
females, and males signal to advertise their quality.  Males can be high or low 
quality. Males always prefer to mate, whereas females prefer to mate only with high 
quality males. (These contexts involving display are assumed to not be the only 
contexts in which females can mate; uniform refusal to mate by a female in these 
contexts does not imply zero fitness.) Suppose too that males have a signal available 
that is more costly for low quality than high quality individuals to send. (The payoffs 
are represented in Table 7.) Then a stable signalling system can evolve in which 
males reliably signal their quality and females condition their mating behaviour on 
the signal.  
 There is also a ‘hybrid equilibrium’ of this game, which we will focus on here, 
in which both senders and receivers sometimes mix their behaviours and sometimes 
do not. High-quality male senders always send the more costly ‘high quality’ signal. 
Low-quality males randomize, sending the high-cost signal in some cases and the 
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low-cost ‘low quality’ signal on other occasions. On the receiver side, males who 
send the low-quality signal are always rejected and those who send the high-quality 
signal are accepted with some probability and rejected the rest of the time. Whether 
a hybrid equilibrium exists depends on the parameter values – payoffs, costs of 
signals, and the frequency of high-quality males – and this equilibrium will involve a 
specific mix of sender behaviours and of receiver behaviours. One example of a set 
of parameters for which an equilibrium exists is given in Table 7 and Figure 5. Here, 
the low-quality males send the high-cost signal with probability ⅓ and high-cost 
signals are accepted with probability ½. This combination of sender and receiver 
strategies is a Nash equilibrium.11 
 
< INSERT FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE > 
 
 
< INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE > 
 
 
 The informational and functional contents of messages at this hybrid 
equilibrium are set out in Table 8. Message M1 has no propositional informational 
content, because no state is ruled out by the message. However, it does have a 
functional content that is propositional: S1. This is the only state in which the 
receiver's rule at equilibrium generates for both sides an above-baseline payoff. As a 
consequence, when M1 is sent in S2, which does happen some of the time, this 
message has false propositional content. It says the world is in S1 when in fact the 
world is in S2. False propositional content is quite different from what Skyrms called 
‘misinformation’. The case in Figure 5 is the only case so far in which a signal 
sometimes has false propositional content, while misinformation in Skyrms's sense is 
found also in cases with bottlenecks and pooling (Sections 4.2, 4.3, 4.4). 
We understand deception to occur when a message with a false content is 
sent and the receiver is induced to behave in a way that benefits the sender and 
harms the receiver. ‘Deception’ in this sense is a success-term; it can be 
distinguished from attempted deception, which occurs when a message with a false 
                                          
11 The equilibrium requires that the probability of the receiver accepting the high cost 
signal (i.e. performing A1 in response to M1) is equal to the cost to low quality 
senders of sending the high cost signal (i.e. of sending M1 in S2). Both are equal to ½ 
in our illustration. This has the effect of ensuring that the benefit to low quality 
individuals of sometimes achieving a mating is exactly balanced, on average, by the 
cost to low quality individuals of sending the high cost signal. 
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content is sent in a way that has the potential to benefit the sender at the expense 
of the receiver. So, for example, when the sender sends M1 in S2 but the receiver 
refuses to mate, that is merely a case of attempted deception. If the receiver does 
mate with the low-quality sender, this is a case of deception. 
 Existing discussions of cases of this kind routinely assume a concept of 
deception similar to ours, without spelling out a view of content that licenses it. For 
example, Zollman et al. [2013] describe the hybrid equilibria that can exist in these 
signalling games in the following terms: ‘In plain English, this means that the sender 
sometimes ‘lies’ and is honest at other times, whereas the receiver only sometimes 
chooses the sender’s favoured action.’ If the notion of ‘lying’ requires that a message 
has a false content, not merely that it withholds some information, then 
informational content as discussed here and elsewhere does not suffice to make 
sense of lying, and something like functional content in our sense is needed. 
 
< INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE > 
 
 A further notable feature of our treatment of this case is that the functional 
content of M2 is undefined, as Table 8 shows. This is because no state of the world 
generates higher-than baseline payoffs given the receiver's equilibrium response to 
M2. Indeed, although M2 is treated in the model as a signal, it is associated neither 
with costs nor the possibility of benefit, so it is more naturally understood as the 
absence of a signal – as a ‘null’ signalling behaviour. 
 While that is a satisfactory result in the present case, in other games with 
intrinsic signalling costs our proposed definition of functional content is more 
problematic. Bergstrom and Lachmann ([1997]) analyze another game with costly 
signals, the Sir Philip Sidney game. They show that there are separating equilibria in 
which both sender and receiver are worse off than they would be if the receiver 
produces its best cover-all response to completely uninformative signals.12 In such a 
separating equilibrium there is no state in which both players obtain payoffs above 
their baseline, as we have defined the baseline; so there is no functional content. 
 To sketch a response to this problem we return to the theoretical motivation 
for our account. Functional content is a matter of more than just coordinating actions 
with the state of the world. That happens in the case of perfect anti-signalling 
mentioned above, where signals are perfectly coordinated with world states but no 
                                          
12  We are grateful to a referee for pointing out the implications of this game. 
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payoffs result. Functional contents arise where the players coordinate actions with 
the state of the world successfully. Isolating cases of successful coordination calls for 
a standard of comparison, which is what our baselines achieve. If one accepts this 
theoretical motivation, then it follows that functional content is not ubiquitous - it is 
absent in some equilibria where signals are coordinated with the state of the world. 
As formulated, our definition has the consequence that functional content is 
absent when players fall into an equilibrium in a costly signalling game that makes 
them worse off in every world state than they would be without signalling (although 
there is functional content in the costly signalling game we analyze here). Rather 
than just accepting that consequence, another solution would be to define baselines 
more locally when there are intrinsic signalling costs, in terms of nearby states in 
which both sides do worse than at the equilibrium. We do not attempt to resolve this 
issue here. 
 
4.6  A further problem arising from divergent interests 
When sender and receiver interests diverge, but do not diverge greatly, a problem 
can arise which has not been addressed in our cases above. That problem comes 
when, given some act or mix of acts produced in response to a message at 
equilibrium, sender and receiver both achieve above-baseline payoffs in the same 
combination of states, but the degrees to which they benefit in each of these states 
differ. Then when a vector representation of functional content is given, strictly 
speaking there will be one vector for the sender and one for the receiver, not a 
single vector describing both.  This does not happen in either of the two cases with 
divergent interests discussed above. In one of these cases (4.5), no message is 
interpreted in a way that gives both parties an above-baseline payoff in more than 
one state (only the sender receives an above-baseline payoff in more than one state, 
given the receiver’s rule for M1). In the other case (4.4), both sender and receiver 
obtain above-baseline payoffs in S1 and S2, given the rules associated with M1, and 
these payoffs do differ between sender and receiver, but for neither agent is one 
state preferable to the other. So there is no qualitative difference between the 
agents with respect to the roles of S1 and S2 in stabilizing this aspect of their 
interaction. 
 When, in other possible cases, the interests of the agents diverge in a way 
that leads to a message being associated with more than one state of the world, for 
both agents, but with different weightings for these states across the two agents, the 
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formulation we give is designed to capture the ‘overlap’ between sender and receiver 
interests (see Appendix for details). As we noted, in such cases it is also 
straightforward to record separate functional content vectors for sender and receiver 
respectively. Comparisons between our preferred functional content vector, which 
captures the overlap, and the separate functional content vectors for sender and 
receiver would show the respects in which sender and receiver have different 
interests in the way the signal is connected to world states at equilibrium. 
 A case put forward by a referee helpfully illustrates another way this kind of 
divergence can arise. In this new case there are four equiprobable states, five 
available acts and two costless signals, with payoffs as given in Table 9. We focus on 
the equilibrium shown in Figure 6, in which both players receive an above-baseline 
payoff in one state for each signal, but in different states. For example when M1 is 
sent, the sender receives a payoff only in S1 and the receiver only in S2. Our ‘overlap’ 
functional content vector is undefined. Table 10 records separate functional content 
vectors for sender and receiver. 
 
< INSERT FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE > 
 
 
< INSERT TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE > 
 
 
< INSERT TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE > 
 
 Comparing the separate functional content vectors for sender and receiver, 
and in the absence of an ‘overlap’ functional content vector, we can see that the two 
players have completely different interests in the way the signal is connected with 
world states at equilibrium. The receiver is only interested in the way M1  carries 
information about state S2 whereas the sender receives a payoff only when S1 
obtains. An alternative perspective on this case would be to argue that sender and 
receiver do share an interest when M1 is sent – an interest in the fact that S1-or-S2 
obtains. A natural move here would be to describe the game in a more coarse-
grained way, so that S1-or-S2 counts as a single state. Sender and receiver would 
then overlap in functional content with respect to that state. The difficulty is to 
formulate a rule for when it is appropriate to move to a more coarse-grained 
functional content vector which does not have the result that all cases of partial 
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pooling turn into cases of perfect signalling with more coarse-grained states. While 
this case is clearly another reason to distinguish functional contents for sender and 
receiver in some cases, we have no settled view as to whether there is also a 
principled way to define a non-vacuous overlap functional content vector in this case. 
 
5  Discussion 
The small selection of examples above show that there is an important role to play 
for a notion of content that goes beyond purely informational content, even in these 
simple cases. Specifically, there is a role for a treatment that is connected to 
equilibria and how they are stabilized by payoffs. The way theorists routinely talk 
about simple signalling systems makes this clear. They say things that implicitly 
draw on a richer notion of content than informational content. This might be seen as 
metaphorical. But we have shown that a concept like this can be made precise and 
shown to be useful, especially in contexts where false content is important such as 
the analysis of deception. 
 Teleosemantics also aimed to capture the involvement signs have with the 
world. The concept of functional content developed here is a fine-grained take on 
that idea. The need to go beyond a purely informational treatment and introduce a 
broadly functional notion of content is one of the insights of (Millikan [1984]), 
(Papineau [1993]) and (Dretske [1988]). What we're doing is combining those ideas 
with Skyrms's introduction of a fine-grained vector representation of content. Our 
functional content vector captures the relative importance of different states when 
more than one state is involved in stabilizing a pattern of sender and receiver 
behaviours. 
 The concept of functional content we have developed here is not the only way 
this could be done. And it is clear that our treatment in this paper still faces some 
problems. We hope to have shown that it is widely applicable enough to illustrate 
that there is space for an account of functional content alongside that of 
informational content.  
 Lastly, we make a comment about the status of these properties, which we 
have been calling a kind of ‘content’. Clearly the signs themselves and their 
associated behaviours are much simpler and more rudimentary than those 
associated with human language and thought. They are probably simpler than most 
non-human sign systems as well. We don't claim that informational and functional 
content exhaust the rich semantic properties seen in language and thought. They 
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can be thought of as simpler members of a family of semantic properties, or as 
precursors to real semantic properties. These simpler semantic or proto-semantic 
properties are, however, important features of signalling systems. Our notion of 
functional content captures a theoretically important aspect of sender-receiver 
interaction. 
 
Appendix: Definition of Functional Content Vector 
 
ܨݑ݊ܿݐ݅݋݈݊ܽ ܿ݋݊ݐ݁݊ݐ ݋݂ ݏ݈݅݃݊ܽ ܯ ൌ ൏ ݔ1σ ,
ݔ2
σ ,…,
ݔ݊
σ ൐  
 
We define the functional content vector for an arbitrary signal M, following the 
procedure given in section 3.2 above. The vectors listed in the case studies above 
are the result of applying this procedure to each signal M1, M2, … found in the model. 
Below we proceed in two parts. First we define the baseline payoff for a signalling 
game. The baseline is then used as a threshold to generate components of the 
functional content vector. 
 
Baseline Payoffs 
 
We define the functional content vector in relation to the baseline payoffs obtained 
for the sender and receiver in the absence of signalling. Baseline for each (ݒҧ௥,  ݒҧ௦) is 
its expected payoff given A*,  the action dictated by the best strategy the receiver 
can adopt without conditioning its behaviour on any signals. In defining the baseline 
here we consider only pure receiver strategies since, in the absence of signals, the 
receiver can never do better by mixing than by pursuing some pure strategy.  
 
ܴ݁ܿ݁݅ݒ݁ݎᇱݏ ܾܽݏ݈݁݅݊݁ ݌ܽݕ݋݂݂, ݒҧ௥   ൌ  ෍ ܲሺ ௜ܵሻݒ௥ሺܣכ| ௜ܵሻ
௡
௜ୀଵ
 
 
ܵ݁݊݀݁ݎᇱݏ  ܾܽݏ݈݁݅݊݁  ݌ܽݕ݋݂݂,  ݒҧ௦    ൌ  ෍ ܲሺ ௜ܵሻݒ௦ሺܣכ| ௜ܵሻ
௡
௜ୀଵ
  
 
ݒ௥ሺܣכ| ௜ܵሻ ൌ  ݎ݁ܿ݁݅ݒ݁ݎᇱݏ ݌ܽݕ݋݂݂ ݂݋ݎ ܽܿݐ݅݋݊ ܣכ ݓ݄݁݊ ݓ݋ݎ݈݀ ݅ݏ ݅݊ ݏݐܽݐ݁ ௜ܵ 
ݒ௦ሺܣכ| ௜ܵሻ ൌ  ݏ݁݊݀݁ݎԢݏ ݌ܽݕ݋݂݂ ݂݋ݎ ܽܿݐ݅݋݊ ܣכ ݓ݄݁݊ ݓ݋ݎ݈݀ ݅ݏ ݅݊ ݏݐܽݐ݁ ௜ܵ 
݊ ൌ ݊ݑܾ݉݁ݎ ݋݂ ݓ݋ݎ݈݀ ݏݐܽݐ݁ݏ ௜ܵ 
 
Functional Content Vector 
 
Components  ݔ௜ in the functional content vector reflect the average payoff received 
from world state ௜ܵ when signal M is sent, thresholded by reference to the baseline 
payoffs calculated above. Non-zero entries correspond to states in which both agents 
receive above-baseline payoffs given the receiver’s rule for M, and record the 
amount by which the threshold is exceeded. The requirement that both agents 
receive above-baseline payoffs implies that the agents have similar payoff matrices 
to some degree, but differences are still possible. Accordingly, we construct the 
matrix entries by using the lesser of the amounts by which the two agents’ payoffs 
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surpass their baseline, ݀୫୧୬ ൫ܣ௝ห ௜ܵ൯. This is designed to represent the overlap between 
the sender’s and receiver’s interests. 
 
 
݀୫୧୬ ൫ܣ௝ห ௜ܵ൯ ൌ  min൫ሺݒ௥൫ܣ௝ห ௜ܵ൯ െ ݒҧ௥ሻ, ሺݒ௦൫ܣ௝ห ௜ܵ൯ െ ݒҧ௦ሻ൯ 
 
This formulation is appropriate when there is a single population of agents that play 
the sender role half the time and the receiver role half the time. If there are separate 
populations of senders and receivers then the payoffs in the payoff matrix should be 
transformed to a common scale. Before calculating the baselines and ݀୫୧୬  the 
sender's payoffs should be linearly transformed so that its maximum payoff is 1, and 
the same for the receiver. 
 
 ݔ௜ ൌ
ە
ۖ
۔
ۖ
ۓ
ܲሺ ௜ܵ|ܯሻ ቐ෍ ܲ൫ܣ௝|ܯ൯݀୫୧୬ ൫ܣ௝ห ௜ܵ൯
௠
௝ୀଵ
ቑ , ݂݅   ෍ ܲ൫ܣ௝|ܯ൯ݒ௥൫ܣ௝ห ௜ܵ൯
௠
௝ୀଵ
൐  ݒҧ௥ ܽ݊݀ ෍ ܲ൫ܣ௝|ܯ൯ݒ௦൫ܣ௝ห ௜ܵ൯
௠
௝ୀଵ
൐ ݒҧ௦ 
 
 
     0,                                                                                 ݋ݐ݄݁ݎݓ݅ݏ݁                                                                                                              
 
 
݉ ൌ ݊ݑܾ݉݁ݎ ݋݂ ܽݒ݈ܾ݈ܽ݅ܽ݁ ܽܿݐ݅݋݊ݏ ܣ௝ 
 
Finally the components are normalized by ߪ so that, as with the informational 
content vector, they sum to 1. 
 
ߪ   ൌ    ෍ ݔ௜
௡
௜ୀଵ
 
 
The use of ݀୫୧୬  terms is only essential in special cases – see Section 4.6 of the main 
text for discussion. In such cases, another option would be to define separate 
functional content vectors for sender and receiver when they differ. We do not hold 
that one of these approaches is better than the other; each might represent different 
features of these cases. 
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Tables 
 
 
  Informational Content Functional Content 
Messages M1 <1, 0>; S1 <1, 0>; S1 
 M2 <0, 1>; S2  <0, 1>; S2 
Table 1: Relations between informational and 
functional content for Case 4.1. Contents are given 
first in vector form and then in a narrative 
summary. 
 
 
 
  Informational Content Functional Content 
 M1 <0.5, 0.5, 0>; S1-or-S2 if y ≥ 2/3 
 <1, 0, 0>; S1 
if 2/3 > y > 1/3 
 <3y-1, 2-3y, 0>; S1-or-S2 
if y ≤ 1/3 
 <0, 1, 0>; S2 
Messages M2 <0, 0, 1>; S3 <0, 0, 1>; S3 
 M3 <0, 0, 1>; S3 <0, 0, 1>; S3 
Table 2: Relations between informational 
and functional content for Case 4.2. 
Contents are given first in vector form and 
then in a narrative summary. 
 
 
 
   Acts  
  A1 A2 A3 
 S1 7 0 2 
States S2 4 6 0 
 S3 0 5 10 
Table 3: Payoffs for a ‘bottleneck’ case. 
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  Informational Content Functional Content 
 M1 <0.5, 0.5, 0>; S1-or-S2 <1, 0, 0>; S1 
Messages M2 <0, 0, 1>; S3 <0, 0, 1>; S3 
Table 4: Relations between informational and 
functional content for Case 4.3. Contents are given 
first in vector form and then in a narrative 
summary. 
 
 
 
   Acts  
  A1 A2 A3 
 S1 2, 10 0, 0 10, 8 
States S2 0, 0 2, 10 10, 8 
 S3 0, 0 10, 10 0, 0 
Table 5: Payoffs in a case of partial 
common interest. Payoffs in each cell 
are to sender and receiver, respectively. 
 
 
 
  Informational Content Functional Content 
 M1 <0.5, 0.5, 0>; S1-or-S2 <0.5, 0.5, 0>; S1-or-S2 
Messages M2 <0, 0, 1>; S3 <0, 0, 1>; S3 
Table 6: Relations between informational and 
functional content for Case 4.4. Contents are 
given first in vector form and then in a narrative 
summary. 
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   Acts 
  A1 (mate) A2 (not mate) 
 
States 
S1 (high-quality male) 2, 2 1, 1 
 
 
S2 (low-quality male)  2, 0 1, 1 
Table 7: Payoffs in the deception case 
described in section 4.5. Payoffs in each cell 
are to sender (male) and receiver (female), 
respectively. 
 
 
 
  Informational Content Functional Content 
Messages M1 <0.5, 0.5>; no propositional 
content 
<1, 0>; S1 
 M2 <0, 1>; S2 none 
Table 8: Relations between informational and 
functional content for Case 4.5. Contents are 
given first in vector form and then where possible 
in a narrative summary. 
 
 
 
    Acts   
  A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 
 S1 2, 2 5, 0 5, 0 0, 0 0, 0 
States S2 2, 2 0, 5 0, 5 0, 0 0, 0 
 S3 2, 2 0, 0 0, 0 5, 0 5, 0 
 S4 2, 2 0, 0 0, 0 0, 5 0, 5 
Table 9: Payoffs in Case 4.6. Payoffs in each 
cell are to sender and receiver, respectively. 
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  Informational Content Functional Content 
for Sender 
Functional Content 
for Receiver 
 M1 <0.5, 0.5, 0, 0>; S1-or-S2 <1, 0, 0, 0>; S1 <0, 1, 0, 0>; S2 
Messages M2 <0, 0, 0.5, 0.5>; S3-or-S4 <0, 0, 1, 0>; S3 <0, 0, 0, 1>; S4 
Table 10: Relations between informational and functional 
content for Case 4.6. Contents are given first in vector form 
and then in a narrative summary. 
 
 
Figure Captions 
 
Figure 1: A signalling system in the case where there are two world states, two acts 
and two signals available. 
 
Figure 2: A case of partial pooling in a system with three states, signals and acts. 
 
Figure 3: Sender and receiver behaviours in a ‘bottleneck’ case, with fewer messages 
than states. 
 
Figure 4: A case of partial common interest. 
 
Figure 5: A case of deception: a hybrid equilibrium of the case described in section 
4.5. S1 and S2 are the possible states of the male sender. M1 is a costly signal. It 
costs ½ for low-quality males (S2) to send M1, but only ¼ for high-quality males 
(S1). Signal M2 has no cost. 
 
Figure 6: Sender and receiver behaviours in the equilibrium considered in Case 4.6. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: A signaling system in the case where there are two world states, two 
acts and two signals available. 
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Figure 2: A case of partial pooling in a 
system with three states, signals and acts. 
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Figure 3: Sender and receiver behaviors in a 
"bottleneck" case, with fewer messages than 
states. 
 
 
S1 
S2 
S3 
M1 
M2 
A1 
A2 
A3 
P(S1)=P(S2)=P(S3) 
 1
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: A case of partial common interest 
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Figure 5: A case of deception: a hybrid 
equilibrium of the case described in section 
4.5. S1 and S2 are the possible states of the 
male sender. M1 is a costly signal. It costs ½ 
for low-quality males (S2) to send M1, but 
only ¼ for high-quality males (S1). Signal M2 
has no cost. 
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Figure 6: Sender and receiver behaviors in 
the equilibrium considered in Case 4.6. 
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